WWJDD?

Published at 13:26 on 2 September 2025

What will J.D. (Vance) do?

I think that is the main question to now ask about the U.S.A. There is a lot of speculation out there about how much time The Donald has left on this Earth, and Trump is not exactly young, so this is a reasonable question to ask.

There are, I think, two almost certainly true general principles that should guide this analysis:

  1. J.D. Vance will be a more competent macroeconomic administrator than Trump.
  2. J.D. Vance is unlikely to inspire the sort of cult following Trump has.

Let’s discuss these in order.

The Economy

Trump’s understanding of economic principles, particularly foreign trade, is just bizarre.

He apparently thinks any trade deficit anywhere implies that someone is getting the better of the U.S.A., and must be stopped. Well, what about essential natural resources that the U.S.A. has an insufficient amount of within its own border to satisfy the demands of its own economy? What if such a resource dominates the economy of a nation or two? Then of course the U.S.A. will run a deficit with those nations. It just has to be that way, that nation has a lot of what the U.S.A. wants, and the U.S.A. does not have so much of what that nation wants. How could it? That other nation is probably one heck of a lot smaller than the U.S.A. Just not enough consumers to buy very much.

The thing is, the U.S.A. still gets whatever resource it is in amounts greater than it otherwise would have, absent foreign trade. This allows the U.S. economy to grow more than it otherwise would have. The U.S.A. ends up better off, even with a trade deficit with Country X.

One of the key insights of economic theory is that transactions can be positive-sum; both parties can emerge better off post-transaction. Transactions don’t have to come with winners and losers. This insight is utterly absent from Trump’s beliefs about international trade.

I don’t grow my own food. Living in a big, expensive city, I can’t. Don’t have the required land. Not particularly interested in being a subsistence farmer, anyhow. So I buy food from my neighbourhood grocery store. I give them money, they give me food. They never give me money for anything. If me and the grocery store were countries, I would be running a trade deficit with them. Does this mean I’m worse off than if I had no access to food?

Trump has even gone so far as to claim “trade wars are good, and easy to win.” Literally no economist, whatever their political biases, believes such a thing. They, almost down to a last one, believe precisely the opposite.

Even the economists that believe in managed trade draw a distinction between an orderly and cautious set of tariffs to drive industrial policy versus the chaotic retaliation and counterretaliation that entails a trade war. Trade wars are bad things that often prompt avoidable economic downturns.

Trump’s trade beliefs are just so out-there bizarre that I think it highly unlikely that J.D. Vance is that out there and bizarre. No, Vance has not criticized Trump’s trade policies, but this is most likely because Vance is just keeping his yap shut until he inherits the throne. A Vance administration will have a more sane and rational trade policy.

As such, a Vance administration is likely to exhibit improved economic performance over the alternate timeline of continued Trump trade policies.

The Cult

Trump is unique. There is hardly anyone else so well-suited to appeal to the moral shortcomings that have been indoctrinated in the American people in order to instill pro-capitalist sentiment into them.

The authority of the capitalist boss is similar to the authority of the dictator within a fascist state. In fact, the authority of the fascist dictator was deliberately modelled on the authority of the capitalist boss; Mussolini called his model for Italy the “corporate state” for this reason.

And it just so turns out that the amount of propaganda needed to instill in a people a consensus in favour of submission to the capitalist boss, something the U.S.A. has excelled at (the U.S.A., alone amongst industrial nations, has never had so much as a politically viable social democratic party), is only very slightly less than the amount needed to instill in them an appreciation for the merits of fascism. This is the root of the problem that has now manifested with Trump, and I started blogging about it over twenty years ago, well before Trump became a major political player.

It’s not just me nor is it a particularly recent insight. Approximately 100 years ago to this very day, Norman Thomas wrote: “… political democracy itself will remain in a perilous state while industrial autocracy continues. It is the old story: a house divided against itself cannot stand. A man not good enough to have anything to say about the conduct of the industry in which he makes his living is not good enough to be a voter in a self-governing republic.”

If I were to engineer the perfect leader to transition the U.S.A. to fascism, I would create someone almost exactly like Donald J. Trump. He would have to be a businessman, yes, but he would have to be a famous businessman, one in the public eye as a result of having been a TV or movie star. His acting role would be one that exemplifies and idealizes the authoritarian power of the capitalist over the worker. He should have a catchphrase such as “You’re fired” which embodies this power. He should have a record of demonstrated success as a self-made businessman. (That final item is something Trump, who inherited his fortune, does not have. But three out four ain’t bad.)

There really isn’t anyone else with these attributes ready to step into Trump’s shoes. At any rate, the one per the Constitution who will step into those shoes is J.D. Vance, who has precisely none of these qualities. He’s not even a businessman! He’s a career government employee who has not worked a single day in the private sector.

The closest businessman to Trump is Elon Musk. But he’s not even a natural-born citizen, and thus is not eligible. Plus, although Musk has a measure of star power, he’s not a TV or movie star. He’s just a capitalist with a knack for grabbing the headlines.

What does this mean? Unpopularity. Trump, with all his star power, is still polling underwater. Vance can, after a possible honeymoon period, be expected to poll more underwater.

The Transformation

The thing is, unpopularity won’t matter so much anymore. Per the previous article, the U.S.A. will no longer be what the U.S.A. once was, Trump having transformed it into a right-wing authoritarian system.

There will probably be some unrest, but it will be dealt with harshly. And the bleak news is that harsh measures typically work in authoritarian societies with naturally submissive populaces. And the latter is what we will have; the U.S. populace having already amply demonstrated its naturally submissive proclivities.

Add to those proclivities an economy that, at least initially, stabilizes itself, and any Vance regime will in large be accepted by a populace who doesn’t value freedom very much but mostly just wants personal safety and material comfort.

And with that, we can trace out the likely arc of the coming Vance Administration:

  1. A more stable economic policy.
  2. Despite the above, initial economic problems.
  3. Growing unpopularity.
  4. Repression.
  5. Economic growth (thanks to No. 1 above eventually bearing fruit).
  6. Regime stabilization.

Any hope for greater political freedom in the U.S.A. will have to wait.

The Slow-Acting Ticking Time Bomb

There will, however, be a slow-acting ticking time bomb, and that time bomb is called corruption. Authoritarian societies are inevitably more corrupt than open ones.

Economically, corruption eventually produces collapse. Crony capitalism is unstable, and crony capitalism in the new U.S.A. will be particularly unstable, existing as it does in a political culture that has proven itself repeatedly incapable of adequately regulating its financial sector.

The only question is how long it will take. It took about thirty years in Indonesia under the Suharto dictatorship, which is squarely within the 20–50 years that fascist political orders typically last. The U.S.A. doing a poor job at financial regulation may push things towards the low end of that range.

Even a political culture with generally low morals can be compelled to reform itself morally and resist once it learns a lengthy and painful lesson in the School of Hard Knocks that wages of low moral standards tend to be most unpleasant in the long run.

Trump is a Transformational President

Published at 10:06 on 1 September 2025

Some U.S. presidents are what can be called transformational presidents. Lincoln (abolition), FDR (welfare state), LBJ (civil rights), etc.

All evidence points to Trump being in the same category, at least as transformative as LBJ and possibly as transformative as Lincoln. My reasoning is as follows:

  1. What Trump did in his first term (significant expansion of presidential powers, coup attempt).
  2. The comparatively very limited response to it, which cemented the legitimacy of what Trump did to expand presidential power, and set the precedent that coup attempts are now a mostly legitimate political tactic to be used as needed, at least by the Right.
  3. What Trump is doing in his second term.
  4. How muted the current response is in relation to what Trump is currently doing.

My initial wording was about the responses of the Democratic Party and the politicians who belong to it. Wording it as such is factually correct, but also factually incomplete, because it is not just the Democratic Party.

We could have the same old weak-willed Democratic Party we do in this timeline, but if we had a public that valued a free and open society more, there would have been massive public outrage at what Trump and the political parties (the Republicans, by enabling him, and the Democrats, by failing to vigorously oppose him) were doing. This would have prompted some combination of the Republican Party abandoning their president (like what happened to Nixon), and/or the Democratic Party pandering to the outrage and no longer being afraid to arrest, prosecute, and jail Trump and his top cronies.

Instead, we saw none of the above. Trump engaged in significant transition towards the principles of right-wing authoritarianism, and it was largely accepted by the vast preponderance of Americans. Oh, sure, there was a lot of grumbling, but in the end, the outcome was acceptance. Acceptance with grumbling is still acceptance. Acceptance with denial grounded in the mythology of American exceptionalism is still acceptance.

Sure, some inconsequential nobodies were prosecuted with much fanfare. So what. The ringleaders got off scot-free. That was the main lesson of the whole escapade.

And now we have his second term, in which Trump has ramped up his transformational initiatives, and the response has been amazingly acquiescent. A few protests here and there, more grumbling, but so far still business as usual. Trump is proposing dictatorship and Americans are generally accepting of the proposal.

Yes, yes, I know: opinion polls show Trump is underwater. Big deal. That is merely a form of grumbling. What matters is action, or lack thereof, and so far it has been primarily the latter.

If you want to see what a lack of acceptance looks like, look what happened in Greece when the Greeks decided not to accept the current state of their nation’s rail transport safety. Look what has happened in France when the French decided that reducing retirement benefits was unacceptable. Look at what South Korea and Brazil are doing in response to excesses by their chief executives.

Yes, yes: I know. There have been protests. A day of protest is planned for today. Some noises are being made about soft secession if Trump does stuff like deploying troops to Chicago. Vote blue no matter who and maybe Lucy won’t pull the football away this time. Colour me skeptical.

And yes, some are vigorously opposing it. The key word here is some. There is nowhere near the degree of opposition happening needed to stop the transformation. Focusing on the exceptions to a general trend is not the correct way to assess a situation.

This gets to why I reworded my list to remove explicit references to the Democratic Party. It’s not just the Democratic Party. Sure, it’s possible to blame a failure to lead on the Democrats. But it’s also the case that the Democrats have genuine reasons to believe that Americans by and large don’t want to be led to defend freedom. It’s a chicken-and-egg situation: the Democrats don’t lead because there’s not much sentiment from below for them to pander to, and there’s not much sentiment from below because the Democrats aren’t leading.

Ultimately, the Democrats’ institutional spinelessness wouldn’t matter if more was happening in the grassroots. Being filled with spineless panderers, the Democratic Party could in that case pander… to the resistance movement. It would be spineless pandering, but it wouldn’t matter: the necessary things would be getting done, and that, more than the mechanics of why they are being done, is what would really matter.

Advocates of revolution would point to the success of the popular mobilization. Advocates of electoral reformism would point to the big blue wave and how the Democrats delivered. The endless reform-versus-revolution arguments would continue without resolution, both camps having some facts with which to argue.

But that, sadly, is all hypothetical. The vast preponderance of currently-available evidence points to Trump being a transformational president.