Blackcap Blog

Published at 18:52 on 7 November 2023

Initially, I thought they had been, simply because the attacks make so little sense from a strategic point of view. (Israel is by far the most militarily powerful country in the region. Hamas is comparatively a military pipsqueak. As such, there was a pretty obvious foreseeable aftermath to the attack: basically what we are seeing now.)

Then I shifted to a model based on mutual misunderstanding coupled with a desire on Hamas’ part to acquire hostages to use as bargaining chips for negotiating prisoner releases. Basically, Israel misunderstood Hamas, was not expecting Hamas to attack and had scaled back border defences, while Hamas misunderstood Israel, was unaware of this, and believed they had to hit very hard in order to have any reasonable chance of scoring any hostages from their more powerful opponent. Hamas was not expecting to overwhelm Israeli defences, had no contingency plans for what to do if they did, and then latent hatred manifested in mostly unplanned attacks and violence against civilians.

The above has the advantage of helping to explain Israel’s intelligence failure. If it was Hamas’ idea all along, and had been planned solely inside Hamas, it becomes easier to conceal those plans. Plans hatched in, say, Iran and communicated to Hamas have many more chances to be discovered by Israeli spies than completely internal ones.

But recently, reports have been circulating in the media that Hamas was planning this sort of murderous mayhem all along. But what is curious about these is their provenance: they come from sources other than the Israeli military. This struck me as strange, because the Israeli military were ones who initially responded to repel the invaders, meaning they are the ones most likely to discover such documents on the bodies of their enemies.

Plus, if such documents are found, it is in Israel’s interest to publicize them. I will also note that faking such documents where none exist is not in Israel’s interest: any such lies will soon be detected by independent experts, causing them to serve the exact opposite purpose of the intended one. (What is known to have happened is bad enough, and there is no need to embellish on it. Instead of instilling sympathy for Israel, the result will be to expose Israel as a dishonest nation.) Tellingly, official IDF sources always refused to confirm the rumours (later shown to be false) of as many as 40 babies being beheaded en masse by Hamas.

Well, at least one official press release does mention such documents. It is surprising that more prominence has not been given to this on Israel’s part (it would make great propaganda), but it does really seem likely that at least some of the pogroms were planned in advance.

I do think that the overall scope of them was significantly larger than planned, because I find it hard to believe that Hamas expected border security to be as weak as it was. But, to reiterate, at least some deliberate butchering of civilians was probably always at least part of the intent.

Which, once again, raises the puzzle of whether or not any external power put Hamas up to it all. My guess is: probably not. The reason is, to reiterate, the intelligence failure leading up to the attacks. I find it highly implausible that, if this was being coordinated from abroad, all three of: Israeli intelligence, US intelligence, and the intelligence agencies of third parties such as the non-US Five Eyes countries all would have missed it. (On the latter part, anything that significant would have been shared with the USA, which would have in turn passed it on to Israel in some form.)

The next question then is: Why? Why would Hamas do that, particularly given that the expected response would be, to reiterate, something very much like what we are seeing right now? That is a subject for a future post.